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ABSTRACT* 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the index inclusion effect for additions to the S&P 
500 index between 1981 and 2015. The analysis finds that between 1990 and 2015 the average 
excess return for additions from the announcement to effective day was 5.64%. The analysis goes 
further by exploring the average excess returns due to inclusion in each year. The paper then seeks 
to determine whether the magnitude of the index inclusion effect is affected by the growth in the 
passive management industry by regressing a number of different measures of passive holdings 
against the intra-year inclusion effect averages. Based on past theories, more passively linked 
funds should create a larger shift in the demand curves for the stocks around inclusion, but the 
results do not yield such conclusions. The index inclusion effect appears to have peaked in the late 
1990s while the passive management industry has continued to grow.    
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*Thank you to my advisor Dr. Vincent Glode for your helpful comments and feedback over the 
past couple of semesters. I really appreciate the time that you gave to me. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The market is split into two types of overarching investment strategies, active 
management and passive management. Active management relies on the research, forecasts, and 
judgment of single managers, co-managers, or a team of managers to try to create a portfolio of 
investments that will outperform some benchmark, such as the S&P 500 index. The fundamental 
assumption is that the market is not perfectly efficient. Therefore, through the employment of 
skill and technique it is possible to identify mispriced securities to buy, sell, and hold in such a 
way to beat the market. On the other hand, passive management uses index funds, which attempt 
to mirror a market index either through full replication, buying all the securities that make up a 
certain index in the same weights, or optimization, buying the most representative sample of 
securities in an index based on correlations, exposure, and risk.1 For example, the Vanguard 500 
Index Fund seeks to exactly match, rather than beat, the S&P 500 index, which allows investors 
access to a well-diversified portfolio with a very low expense ratio. 2 Jack Bogle, Vanguard’s 
founder, launched the first index mutual fund in August 1976 with assets under management of 
only $11 million. The same Vanguard 500 Index Fund now has over $225 billion under 
management.3 Exchange-traded funds, or ETFs, are a subset of index funds that were launched 
                                                     
1 See Blume and Edelen (2002) for a discussion on the inflexibility experienced by S&P 500 index funds looking to 
minimize tracking error. 
2 From Vanguard 500 Index Fund Prospectus: “Security Selection The Fund attempts to track the investment 
performance of a benchmark index that measures the return of predominantly large-cap stocks. The Fund uses the 
replication method of indexing, meaning that it generally holds the same stocks as its target index and in 
approximately the same proportions.” 
3 Vanguard 500 Index Fund Investor Shares Webpage 
URL: https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/snapshot?FundId=0040&FundIntExt=INT 
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in 1993 with the creation of the SPDR S&P 500 ETF, which now has over $185 billion under 
management.4 The following discussion will explore whether this growth in the passive 
management industry and the share of U.S. equities passively managed has affected the way a 
stock reacts after being added to the most widely tracked index, the S&P 500. 
William F. Sharpe, in his paper “The Arithmetic of Active Management,” very simply 
outlined the rationale behind passive management. Passive investors theoretically hold all of the 
securities in the market in the same proportions that those securities exist in the market, which 
implies that the overall return to passive investors must equal the market return (Sharpe 1991). 
Therefore, based on simple arithmetic, the average actively managed dollar return must also 
equal the market return, which leads Sharpe to consider active management a “zero-sum game” 
(Sharpe 1991). It follows that because active management is more costly due to the research 
involved, investing in passive management should always be a better strategy net of costs when 
comparing the average performance of the two strategies. In light of this analysis, a great deal of 
academic finance literature sought to explain the seemingly overweight allocation of funds to 
active management.5 Judging by the direction of more recent fund flows, investors have begun to 
believe this arithmetic truism more and more over the past two decades.  
This growth in the passive management industry has created a slight abnormal return for 
stocks around the time that they are added to a popular market index, which is called the index 
inclusion effect. The index inclusion effect runs counter to typical efficient market hypotheses 
                                                     
4 SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust Prospectus on asset allocation: To maintain the correspondence between the 
composition and weightings of Portfolio Securities and Index Securities, the Trustee adjusts the Portfolio from time 
to time to conform to periodic changes made by S&P to the identity and/or relative weightings of Index Securities in 
the Index. 
5 For further discussion, see Gruber (1996) for evidence of active management outperforming but overcharging, 
Berk and Green (2004) for evidence that funds can outperform but will, in turn, attract capital that makes it more 
difficult to outperform, Stambaugh (2010) for evidence that money flows out of active management slowly because 
of slow learning and decreasing returns to scale in the aggregate, Glode (2011) for evidence that actively managed 
funds tend to do better in bad markets so they serve as a sort of insurance.  
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and the capital asset pricing model, which posit that a stock’s value or price is equal to a 
company’s future expected cash flows discounted by its systematic risk. 6  Based on this theory, 
demand curves for stocks should be almost perfectly horizontal, and changes in price should be 
driven only by a change in a stock’s fundamental value based on some new information. Supply 
and demand shocks should not have a noticeable effect on the price of a stock.  
In 1986, Shleifer hypothesized that demand curves for stocks actually slope downward by 
studying the abnormal return on the day following announcement of inclusion in the index, 
which occurs after the close of trading (Shleifer 1986). He found that between 1976 and 1983 the 
average abnormal return was 2.79% with very high statistical significance (Shleifer 1986). The 
S&P did not begin making announcements public until 1976, the same year that index funds 
began. Before 1989, the announcement day and the effective day of inclusion were the same. His 
analysis also found that the premium around the inclusion persisted for at least a month 
following the change. Shleifer (1986) and Schultz (2008) argued that inclusion in the index in 
and of itself does not provide extra information about a company’s fundamental value so this 
price jump must be consistent with the hypothesis of long-run downward sloping demand curves 
for stocks rather than the information hypothesis. Due to index funds’ being required to buy 
these stocks after inclusion, the demand curve for the stock shifts right, creating this price effect. 
This paper led to a growing strand of literature studying the index inclusion effect through 
different time periods.   
Consistent with the hypothesis of downward sloping demand curves, between 1990 and 
1995, Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) found that the abnormal return around the announcement 
date was 3.158% and 3.807% between the announcement date and the close of the day on which 
                                                     
6 See Sharpe (1964) for a discussion of the Capital Asset Pricing Model and its driving assumptions 
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the change takes place (which occurs after the market closes). The analyses that study post-1989 
inclusion effects are fundamentally different because of the lag between the announcement date 
and the inclusion date. Index fund managers with the objective of minimizing tracking error are 
incentivized to buy the stock as close to the inclusion time as possible, despite the possibility of 
paying a premium. Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) found that the trading volume on the day when 
the change occurs was three times that of the volume on the day the change is announced. 
Between 1976 and 1989 and between 1990 and 2000, Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) found 
an abnormal return for additions around the announcement day of 3.17% and 5.45%, 
respectively. Furthermore, the abnormal return between 1990 and 2000 for the time period 
between the announcement date and the effective date was 8.90% (Chen et al. 2004). Elliot, Van 
Ness, Walker, and Warr (2006) find evidence of announcement day abnormal returns of 5.67% 
between 1993 and 2001. They hypothesize, similarly to Chen et al. that the reason is a mix of 
increased investor awareness and price pressure (short-term downward sloping demand curves). 
Finally, Petajisto (2011) finds a market-adjusted price impact on additions to the S&P 500 of 
8.8% between 1990 and 2005 and further finds evidence for price elasticity of demand that is 
consistent with downward sloping demand curves. Based on these arguments, the magnitude of 
the price increase should be positively correlated with the percentage of equities passively 
managed because the shift in the demand curve upon inclusion should be greater. 
The percentage of total investor capital invested in passively managed products has risen 
dramatically over the past 35 years, especially with funds flowing into index equity mutual funds 
and ETFs more recently. In 1980, index equity funds represented just 0.2% of total equity mutual 
funds’ net assets. By 2000, that percentage had grown to 9.5%, and by 2014 the index funds held 
20.2% (ICI, Investment Company Factbook 2015) (See Figure 1 for visualization). Furthermore, 
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between 2007 and 2014, actively managed domestic equity mutual funds experienced net 
outflows of $659 billion while index domestic equity mutual funds and ETFs experienced $1 
trillion in net new cash over the same time period (ICI, Investment Company Factbook 2015). 
Retail investors, or those who trade in a personal account, and institutional money have 
increasingly been willing to accept what the market dictates rather than trying, and often failing, 
to beat the market at a higher cost. 
This paper will examine whether this substantial directional shift from active to passive 
fund flows has had a material effect on the magnitude of the index inclusion effect. The 
hypothesis before performing the analysis was that the inclusion effect would increase with the 
percentage of passively managed U.S. equity mutual fund assets due to a larger shift in the 
downward sloping demand curves for included stocks. Section 2 of this paper describes the 
selection criteria for the sample and the data used. Section 3 discusses the methodology for the 
analysis. Section 4 presents the results of the analysis and a discussion of the findings. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
DATA 
According to the Investment Company Institute, the S&P 500 index is the most widely tracked 
index, with more than 33% of index mutual fund assets linked to the S&P 500. The percentage of 
index equity mutual fund assets linked to the S&P 500 is even higher. Therefore, the analysis of 
the index inclusion effect will focus exclusively on additions to the S&P 500, which we believe 
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is representative of the broader indexed universe. The abnormal price effect on deletions from 
the index falls outside the scope of this paper.7  
 
S&P 500 Addition and Announcement Rules  
The S&P 500 index is designed to be representative of the U.S. equity markets, and, in 
turn, the U.S. economy. The S&P 500 focuses on the large-cap sector of the market and includes 
a large portion of the total value of the U.S. equity market. This index is weighted based on float-
adjusted market capitalization and is rebalanced annually in June; however, throughout the year 
the stocks included in the S&P 500 can change due to additions and deletions based on eligibility 
criteria released by the S&P index selection committee. The eligibility criteria are created in such 
a way to make inclusion in the S&P 500 somewhat subjective so that additions are not easily 
predicted. Additions and deletions come in pairs, with additions usually driven by a deletion 
from the index based on a company breaking one of the eligibility criteria for a sustained period 
of time.  
 A brief overview of the eligibility criteria follows: 8 
Market Capitalization: Unadjusted company market capitalization of $5.3 billion or more, a 
level which is reviewed from time to time 
Liquidity: Adequate liquidity and reasonable price – Using composite pricing and volume, the 
ratio of annual dollar value traded to float-adjusted market cap should be 1.00 or greater 
Domicile: U.S. company, which is measured on a number of technical factors 
Public Float: Public float of at least 50% of the stock 
                                                     
7 For discussion of the abnormal returns on deletions and potential asymmetric responses see: Lynch & 
Mendenhall (1997); Chen, Noronha, & Singal (2004); and Elliott, Van Ness, Walker, & Warr (2006) 
8 For full eligibility criteria see “Eligibility Criteria” section of S&P U.S. Indices Methodology at 
http://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-us-indices.pdf 
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Sector Classification: Contribution to sector balance maintenance, as measured by a comparison 
of GICS sector’s weight in an index with its weight in the market, in the relevant market cap 
range 
Financial Viability: The sum of the most recent four consecutive quarters’ as-reported earnings 
should be positive as should the most recent quarter. Balance sheet leverage should also be 
operationally justifiable in the context of both its industry peers and its business model 
Treatment of IPOs: IPOs should be seasoned for 6-12 months before being considered for 
addition to an index 
Eligible Securities: Include all U.S. common equities listed on NYSE, NYSE Arca, NYSE 
MKT, NASDAQ Global Select Market, NASDAQ Select Market, and NASDAQ Capital 
Market. Business development companies, limited partnerships, master limited partnerships, 
limited liability companies, OTC bulletin board issues, closed-end funds, ETFs, ETNs, royalty 
trusts, tracking stocks, preferred and convertible preferred stock, unit trusts, equity warrants, 
convertible bonds, investment trusts, rights, ADRs, ADSs and MLP IT units are not eligible, but 
REITs are eligible.  
 Beginning in 1976, the S&P index committee began announcing changes to the S&P 
index publicly after the close of trading and the inclusion became effective at the market open 
the following day. In October of 1989, the S&P changed its policy regarding announcements in 
an effort to alleviate the pricing pressure from index funds that was beginning to become 
apparent (Beneish and Whaley 1996). After October 1989 to current day, the S&P pre-announces 
changes to index membership after the market close anywhere from a day in advance to about a 
month in advance of the effective inclusion date. The actual change in index composition occurs 
after the market close on the effective inclusion date. Henceforth, announcement date will 
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indicate the day on which the S&P made the announcement after the market close and will be 
referred to as “AD.” The effective date will indicate the day on which the actual change occurred 
after the market close and will be referred to as “ED.”  
 
Sample Construction for Composition Changes and Other Data 
The sample set started with the exhaustive list of 1,072 additions stock additions to the 
S&P 500 that have occurred between 1970 and 2015 and their effective dates of inclusion. Public 
announcements of changes to the index did not begin occurring until 1976, so those first six 
years were eliminated. Furthermore, the requisite price data prior to 1981 were not available at a 
sufficient level to compute returns on a meaningful sample size (more than 2 additions in a year). 
These eliminations brought the sample size from 1,072 additions to 853 additions. The data were 
then split between changes occurring between 1981 and October 1989 (247) and changes 
occurring after October 1989 (621) to account for the change in the S&P announcement policy. 
To find the announcement date for the post-policy change stocks, the S&P Dow Jones Indices 
news archives was first searched for the initial article announcing the change. If this press release 
was not readily available from the archives, the date of the first article published that reported the 
S&P announcement was used, which was tested and found to be a completely reliable proxy. 
From the greater dataset, companies were removed that had been included in the S&P due to 
spinoffs, mergers, or major restructurings, had not been trading for at least 20 days prior to the 
effective date of inclusion, and for which the date of announcement and the data of inclusion 
were not at least a day apart if the change occurred after October 1989. Furthermore, stocks for 
which there was not available historical pricing data from Bloomberg were removed. These 
criteria narrowed the sample to 106 stocks pre-October 1989 and 444 stocks for the period 
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ending in 2015 (see Table 1 in Exhibit 1 for breakdown by year). Removing stocks without 
available pricing data may have induced some survivorship bias. However, this bias should not 
be a significant issue for the analysis because of the difference in time horizons around studying 
the inclusion effect and the long term survival of a company, which cannot be known at the time 
of the inclusion.         
For the remaining sample, stock prices and S&P 500 index prices were pulled from 
Bloomberg for the close of the following dates: 30 trading days prior to AD (AD – 30), 20 
trading days prior to AD (AD – 20), 1 trading day prior to AD (AD – 1), AD, 1 trading day post 
AD (AD + 1), 20 trading days post AD (AD + 20), 30 trading days post AD (AD + 30), 30 
trading days prior to ED (ED – 30), 20 trading days prior to ED (ED – 20), 1 trading day prior to 
ED (ED – 1), ED, 1 trading day post ED (ED + 1), 20 trading days post ED (ED + 20), and 30 
trading days post ED (ED + 30). Any and all cash dividends that were issued during any given 
time period were pulled from the CRSP database. Prices were also appropriately adjusted for any 
stock splits that occurred during the analyzed time frames.   
 
Passively Managed Assets 
A number of different measures of passively managed assets and index linked funds were 
gathered from a variety of data sources. Most of these data display a similar trend in the 
investment management industry of assets flowing into passively managed products (see Figure 
1). The Investment Company Institute data provided total net mutual fund assets, total net equity 
mutual fund assets, and the percentage of equity mutual fund assets that were indexed from 1980 
to 2014. Annual surveys conducted by the S&P Dow Jones Indices, provided data for the total 
assets mechanically linked (including index equity mutual funds and ETFs) to the S&P 500 from 
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1981 to 2015. The total market capitalization of the S&P 500 constituents between 1990 and 
2015 was taken from Bloomberg. Dr. Kenneth French and Dr. Robert Stambaugh provided 
estimates of the fraction of U.S. equity owned directly by individuals from 1980 to 2014 as well 
as the fraction of institutionally owned equity that was actively managed between 1986 and 
2006. 9 Martijn Cremers and Antti Petajisto provided their data from 1980 to 2014, for what they 
consider “active share,” or the fraction of actively managed equity mutual fund portfolios that 
differ from the index to which their performance is benchmarked (2009). See the appendix for 
visualizations of the above discussed data.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
To estimate the index inclusion effect a stock’s excess return (ER) over the index return was 
computed during given time spans related to the announcement date and the effective date of the 
specific inclusion. 
Excess Return = ((St + Dt-1 to t) /St-1 – 1) – (Mt/Mt-1 – 1)         (1) 
Where t = the later date, t-1 = the earlier date, S = the stock price, D = any cash dividend paid 
between the time t-1 and t, M = S&P 500 index price. The logically relevant pairs for additions 
post October 1989 of t and t-1 are displayed in Table 2a of the appendix. Each stock was also 
tagged with the year in which the announcement of inclusion took place for later sorting and 
averaging by year. While a stock’s return that is included in the S&P 500 will have an effect on 
the return of the overall index, this effect was viewed as negligible. Furthermore, traditional 
abnormal returns, or alpha, using the CAPM were not computed due to the short time spans 
being considered and the empirical failings of the CAPM. Using Equation 1, excess returns were 
                                                     
9 Thank you to Professor Robert Stambaugh for providing much of the data used in this section. 
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calculated for each addition between the relevant dates. Additions in the sample occurring prior 
to October 1989 were treated separately as the announcement date and effective date were the 
same. Therefore, only the time pairs outlined in Table 2b were tested. Using a simple arithmetic 
mean, the global means of the excess returns were computed for each time pair. Again, global 
means for pre- and post-October 1989 were calculated separately. Standard t-tests with a 
hypothesized mean of 0 were performed to determine the statistical significance of the signs of 
the results.  
 The global means helped inform which dependent variables relating to the index 
inclusion effect would best show how the shift towards passive investment vehicles has affected 
the magnitude of the inclusion effect. Exhibit 2 shows clearly the trend that index linked 
investments have increased over time. To get a general sense of how the index inclusion effect 
has trended throughout the same period of time, the excess returns using Equation 1 for each 
addition were then calculated again for the same time spans outlined in Table 2. In this round of 
analysis, the results for each time span were grouped by year and then averaged using a simple 
arithmetic mean. Again standard t-tests with a hypothesized mean of 0 were performed to 
determine the statistical significance of the signs of the excess returns for each year. These 
means were then saved in order to become dependent variables for the regression analysis using 
the different measures of passive investment management as explanatory variables.  
  At this stage, pre-October 1989 results were ignored in order to simplify the analysis and 
ensure consistent comparisons. Furthermore, total market cap data for the S&P 500 index was 
not available until 1990. To better test the hypothesis of positive correlation between growth in 
the passive investment management industry and the magnitude of the index inclusion effect, 
measures of passive investment management were broken up into two categories: general and 
14 
 
S&P 500 specific (see Exhibits 2 & 3). General explanatory variables were measurements that 
provided insight into the overall growth of the passive management industry. These variables 
included the following (see Exhibit 2): ICI Total Net Assets of Index Mutual Funds (AIMF), ICI 
Total Net Assets of Index Equity Mutual Funds (AIEMF), ICI % of Total Equity Mutual Fund 
Assets Indexed (%EMFI), and % Passive Share computed as 1-Cremers’ Active Share % (%PS). 
S&P 500 specific variables had a direct link to the magnitude of assets indexed to the S&P 500 
(see Exhibit 3). These variables included the following: ICI Total Net Index Mutual Fund Assets 
Linked to the S&P 500 (IMFSP500), ICI % of Total Index Mutual Fund Assets Linked to S&P 
500 (%IMFSP500), % Change YoY of Net Index Mutual Fund Assets Linked to S&P 500 
(YoY%SP500), S&P Indices Survey Total Assets (including ETFs) Mechanically Indexed to 
S&P 500 (SP500-I), % Change YoY of SP500-I (YoY%SP500-I), and % of Total Market Cap of 
S&P 500 Indexed (%SP500MKT).  
 Following the analysis of the global means and yearly means, yearly excess returns from 
AD to AD + 1 and AD to ED were chosen as the dependent variables for which to test whether 
the size of the passive investment management industry has a material effect on the index 
inclusion effect. To perform this analysis, simple least-squares Y vs. X regression models were 
run with the various annual independent variables discussed above against the chosen dependent 
variables. The sign and significance of the beta coefficients of the regression were used to draw 
conclusions.  
 
RESULTS 
Global Means 
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See Exhibit 5 for the results of the computation of the global means for the excess returns to S&P 
500 additions around the announcement and effective dates. The results are consistent with prior 
literature discussing the index inclusion effect, with an abnormal return for additions between the 
announcement date and the inclusion date of about 5.64% between October 1989 and the end of 
2015. It is interesting to note that the magnitude of the excess return between ED and ED + 1 for 
additions prior to October 1989 is about the same as the average magnitude of excess returns 
between AD and AD + 1 for additions after the policy change. Prior to Oct. 1989, that excess 
return could more easily be attributed to pricing pressure stemming from index fund demand 
because there was no forewarning of an inclusion. The fact that there is not a statistically 
significant return for ED-1 to ED pre-Oct. 1989 provides evidence that investors were not able to 
guess index changes, or else there would likely be evidence of front running. Similarly, the 
return on the day leading up to the announcement for the post-Oct. 1989 sample is barely 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, with a very small positive excess return.  
In that index funds do not typically buy the securities until the effective inclusion, the 
highly statistically significant excess return of 3.32% between AD and AD + 1 provides evidence 
of other investors in the market seeking to take advantage of the demand for the stock that index 
funds will provide at the time of inclusion. These investors are willing to buy the stock at a 
slightly higher price with the expectation that there will be an easy exit opportunity upon 
inclusion. However, surprisingly there is still a statistically significant drift from between the 
close the day after the announcement and the close on the day of inclusion, about 2.3%. One 
would expect that arbitrageurs in the market would appropriately match the expected inclusion 
demand brought by indexers by buying at the announcement price in the same quantity, thereby 
transferring the pricing pressure that used to occur around inclusion to the time around 
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announcement. In this way the pricing pressure around inclusion should be alleviated because the 
arbitrageurs are waiting with supply of the stock to unload. Otherwise, there are essentially 
arbitrage profits that remain on the table as evidenced by this drift. Nevertheless, it appears from 
this analysis that the pressure from the inclusion effect after October 1989 overshoots the 
adequate pricing level and, on average, the stocks fall about 2.2% more than the market in the 30 
trading days following inclusion. This reversal, however, is not as great in magnitude as the 
increase. Given that there is not significant fundamental information contained in inclusion, these 
excess returns provide further evidence of downward sloping demand curves for stocks that runs 
counter to the efficient market theory.     
  
Yearly Means 
See Exhibits 6, 7, and 8 for the mean excess returns around the announcement and the effective 
inclusion date for the period pre-October 1989 and post-October 1989 broken down by year. 
These tables also provide number of additions included for each year and the t-statistics 
associated with the means. The pre-October 1989 data provide little analytical support. The 
breakdown of the annual means show very clearly without the need for regression models that 
the index inclusion effect has continued to grow with the passive management industry. In fact 
the opposite seems to be true, as the S&P 500 inclusion effect peaked in the late 1990s and early 
2000s and has dwindled to statistical insignificance since. Since 2010, 2015 was the only year 
that exhibited a statistically significant positive inclusion effect between the announcement date 
and the effective date despite the continued growth in the proportion of index equity mutual 
funds and ETFs. Nevertheless, not a single year between 1990 and 2015 had a negative average 
excess return between the announcement day and the day following the announcement. 
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However, it seems that markets have become more efficient, with almost zero or negative drift 
occurring between the day after announcement and the effective date. Since 2005, only three 
years have exhibited statistically significant drift. Furthermore, the excess return between 
announcement and 30 trading days after effective inclusion has been negative in each of the past 
seven years. These changes to the index inclusion effect potentially indicate that investors, 
possibly hedge funds or other risk arbitrageurs are increasingly making bets on which stocks will 
be chosen to be added to the index. Wurgler points out that arbitrageurs can flatten demand 
curves for stocks, which is a possible explanation for the disappearance of the inclusion effect as 
the demand curves are no longer as steeply downward sloping (2010). These contradictory 
results may also lend credence to a number of other explanations for the index inclusion effect 
that have been offered in the past and often rejected, namely improved investor awareness, 
improved liquidity, and improved operating performance due to inclusion.  
 
Regression 
To further illustrate the findings from the yearly means described above, the regression outputs 
are displayed in Exhibit 9. The top table displays the output using the dependent variable AD to 
AD + 1 and the bottom table displays the output using the dependent variable AD to ED. Most 
importantly, the tables provide a measure of RSquare, which is the percentage of variance in the 
dependent variable that can be explained by the independent variable, a measure of the beta 
coefficient, which shows the magnitude of the effect a unit change in the explanatory variable 
would have on the dependent variable, and a measure of the constant or intercept, which is the 
level the dependent variable would be at if the explanatory variable were 0. Nearly all of the 
regression coefficients are statistically significantly negative, indicating that the index inclusion 
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effect actually seems to decrease in magnitude with an increase in passive fund management. All 
of the “general” explanatory variables have been trending upwards while the S&P index 
inclusion effect has been trending downwards. However, the major confounding factor is the 
growing market understanding of the index inclusion effect that occurs with the passage of time. 
This allows for arbitrageurs to more accurately trade on inclusion information or even predict 
inclusions, which decreases the level of abnormal returns. These results also show that there is 
definitely not a causal link between strictly the level of assets passively managed and the 
magnitude of the S&P 500 index inclusion effect. However, the regression with the most 
explanatory power, or the highest RSquare value (52.71%), while directly contradicting the 
initial hypothesis of a growing index inclusion effect, actually supports the reasoning behind the 
initial hypothesis. The explanatory variable %IMFSP500 is a measurement of percentage of total 
index mutual fund assets linked to the S&P 500. This variable has been steadily declining as has 
the index inclusion effect as passive funds have been allocated elsewhere. Hence the beta is 
highly statistically significant and positive as both measures have declined in tune. The S&P 500 
index used to be by far the most common index to link passive funds to. However, in recent 
years, it seems that despite growth in S&P 500 index linked assets, other indexes are benefiting 
in greater proportion, such as world equity indexes and hybrid bond indexes. Therefore, the shift 
in the demand curve for S&P 500 additions from mechanical buying from index funds may have 
lessened in magnitude.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper provides an updated analysis of the index inclusion effect for the S&P 500 index and 
an analysis of whether the growth in the passive management industry witnessed over the past 25 
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years has had a material impact on this effect. From 1990 to 2015 the excess return for additions 
to the S&P 500 averaged 5.64% between the announcement date and the effective date of 
inclusion and 3.32% between the announcement date and the following day. Looking at the 
excess returns broken down by year, the index inclusion effect appears to have peaked in the late 
1990s and early 2000s with excess returns in the teens and has since withered. While the passive 
management industry was still growing at that time, there is not strong evidence that this growth 
was a driving factor in the magnitude of the index inclusion effect as was the initial hypothesis. 
In recent years the trends have been going in opposite directions. This may be due to markets 
becoming more efficient, thereby flattening the demand curves for stocks, or the downward 
sloping demand curve theory may have been wrong. Neoclassical asset pricing theory assumes 
that changes to a stock’s price should be a result of some new information about the 
corporation’s value to its shareholders (Belasco, Finke, Nanigian 2012, Kyle 1985). Following 
the neoclassical pricing theory, the increase in valuation due to inclusion in the S&P 500 could 
be attributed to either greater intrinsic value due to increased liquidity or increased informational 
accuracy from greater analyst coverage following inclusion in a major index (Belasco, et. al 
2012). 
 No matter the cause, the analysis in this paper that shows the decline in the index 
inclusion effect is welcome news to indexers who over the past 20 years have been forced to buy 
stocks upon inclusion at inflated prices. This created index turnover costs that decreased total 
returns. The effect was exacerbated when the price increase in the days leading up to inclusion 
reversed after inclusion. This begs the question of whether the S&P 500 should pre-announce 
inclusions at all, which clearly in the past has allowed arbitrageurs to buy the stocks at 
announcement and sell to indexers at inclusion. However, it may be better to make the process 
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even more transparent. One area for further study is how the amount of time between the 
announcement and the effective date affects the post inclusion reversal that could be seen in the 
often negative returns between ED + 1 and ED + 30. Another area for further study is how the 
index inclusion effect differs based on the size of the firm being included.  
EXHIBITS 
 
Exhibit 1: This table displays the changes to the initial sample to arrive at the final data sample. 
Table 1 -- Sample Broken Down By Year
Pre Policy Change Post Policy Change
Year Initial Sample Final Sample Year Initial Sample Final Sample
1981 21 6 1990 15 7
1982 28 11 1991 13 6
1983 19 6 1992 7 4
1984 30 14 1993 12 4
1985 28 16 1994 16 11
1986 28 15 1995 31 16
1987 27 10 1996 22 12
1988 25 14 1997 26 19
1989 26 14 1998 39 26
Total 232 106 1999 42 33
2000 54 33
2001 30 22
2002 23 18
2003 9 7
2004 19 13
2005 18 14
2006 31 24
2007 40 34
2008 38 33
2009 25 22
2010 16 12
2011 19 13
2012 18 13
2013 18 15
2014 16 14
2015 24 19
Total 621 444
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                  Panel A Panel B 
 
                Panel C Panel D  
 
Exhibit 2: These are the four general explanatory variables that show the trend of growth in the 
passive investment management industry. Panel A shows the percentage of Total Equity Mutual 
Assets that are invested in Index Equity Mutual Funds, Panel B shows the percentage of actively 
managed equity funds that mimic the benchmark their performance is measured against as 
measured by Cremers (2009), Panel C shows the Total Net Assets invested in Index Mutual 
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Funds, and Panel D shows the Total Net Assets invested in Index Equity Mutual Funds. All of 
the Panels display the upward trends that led to the hypothesis of an increased index inclusion 
effect. 
                     Panel A Panel B 
                    Panel C Panel D 
                   Panel E Panel F 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 3: These are the five S&P 500 specific variables, which display somewhat contradictory 
trends to the general variables in Exhibit 1. While the total assets directly linked to the S&P 500 
still appear to be increasing (Panel A & Panel D), this growth is being outpaced by the overall 
growth in Index Mutual Funds as Panel C shows a decline in the % of Index Mutual Fund Assets 
$0
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
$700,000
$800,000
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
ICI Total Net Mutual Fund Assets Linked to S&P 
500 (IMFSP500)
15%
83% 77% 76%
55%
41%
-4% -8%
-19%
36%
16%
5%
14%
4%
-36%
30%
14%
0%
14%
34%
17%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
% Change YoY of Net Index Mutual Fund Assets Linked 
to S&P 500 (YoY%SP500)
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
ICI % of Total Index Mutual Fund Assets Linked to 
S&P 500 (%IMFSP500)
0
500,000,000
1,000,000,000
1,500,000,000
2,000,000,000
2,500,000,000
3,000,000,000
S&P Indices Survey Total Assets Mechanically 
Indexed to S&P 500 (SP500-I)
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%
10.0%
11.0%
12.0%
13.0%
14.0%
20
15
20
14
20
13
20
12
20
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
% of Total Market Cap of S&P 500 Indexed 
(%SP500MKT)
-60.0%
-40.0%
-20.0%
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
% Change YoY of SP500-I  (YoY%SP500-I)
23 
 
linked to the S&P 500. Furthermore, Panel E shows that the total Market Capitalization of the 
S&P 500 is growing at about the same rate as S&P 500 linked assets, with the trend line 
relatively flat. 
 
 
Exhibit 4: These tables display the beginning and end dates for the different periods of analysis 
for index additions with “AD” referring to the announcement date and “ED” referring to the 
effective date of inclusion. Table 2b has fewer time periods to test because prior to October 
1989, the announcement date and effective date were one in the same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2a: Time Spans Tested Post Oct. 1989
t -1 t Reason
AD - 1 AD Test Predictability of Announcement
AD AD + 1 Test Magnitude of Early Buying
AD ED Test Magnitude of Inclusion Effect
AD + 1 ED Test Magnitude of Drift
ED ED + 1 Test Magnitude of Mechanical Buying
AD ED + 20 Test Persistence of Inclusion Effect
AD ED + 30 Test Persistence of Inclusion Effect
ED + 1 ED + 20 Test Persistence of Inclusion Effect
ED + 1 ED + 30 Test Persistence of Inclusion Effect
Table 2b: Time Spans Tested Pre Oct. 1989
t -1 t Reason
ED - 1 ED Test Predictability of Announcement
ED ED + 1 Test Magnitude of Mechanical Buying
ED + 1 ED + 20 Test Persistence of Inclusion Effect
ED + 1 ED + 30 Test Persistence of Inclusion Effect
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Exhibit 5: The above tables show the global means for each of the time spans of analysis. The 
results are an average of the all of the excess returns for additions that were generated between t-
1 and t. For example, the average excess return for all 444 additions post October 1989 between 
the announcement date and the day after the announcement date was 3.32%. 
Global Means Pre October 1989
Time Span
t -1 t N Mean t-stat Significant
ED - 1 ED 108 0.06% (0.3179)
ED ED + 1 108 3.21% (12.7041) **
ED + 1 ED + 20 108 1.81% (1.8024) **
ED + 1 ED + 30 108 1.03% (1.0941)
** Significant at 95% Level
Global Means Post October 1989
Time Span
t -1 t N Mean t-stat Significant
AD - 1 AD 444 0.29% (1.9061) **
AD AD + 1 444 3.32% (16.4184) **
AD ED 444 5.64% (9.9189) **
AD + 1 ED 444 2.27% (4.3689) **
ED ED + 1 444 -0.87% (-3.8306) **
AD ED + 20 444 -0.39% (-1.5844)
AD ED + 30 444 -0.49% (-1.6876) **
ED + 1 ED + 20 444 -0.17% (-0.2714)
ED + 1 ED + 30 444 -2.18% (-3.9392) **
** Significant at 95% Level
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Exhibit 6: This table displays the average excess returns for a given year over a given time span 
in relation to the announcement date and inclusion date. The table also provides data on the 
sample size for each given year and the t-values of the means after performing a standard t-test to 
test the sign of the average. 
Yearly Means Pre October 1989
Year N ED -1 to ED  Pre Change ED to ED + 1  Pre Change ED + 1 to ED + 20 Pre Change ED + 1  to ED + 30 Pre Change
1981 6 -0.47% 3.30% -2.23% -3.38%
(-0.7657) (10.5488)** (-0.9635) (-0.7941)
1982 11 0.21% 2.24% 1.16% 4.74%
(0.237) (2.596)** (0.4813) (1.582)
1983 6 -0.22% 2.19% -3.44% -4.60%
(-0.2971) (1.6229) (-0.8213) (-1.0222)
1984 14 -0.38% 2.25% -0.24% 2.65%
(-0.5122) (3.7674)** (-0.1154) (1.2614)
1985 16 0.26% 1.76% 0.10% -0.41%
(0.5) (7.6738) (0.0329) (-0.1365)
1986 15 0.22% 4.43% 3.07% 2.39%
(0.6737) (8.9955) (1.8885)** (1.0304)
1987 10 0.01% 4.87% 5.32% 5.99%
(0.0193) (4.1027)** (3.033)** (2.4025)**
1988 14 0.17% 4.50% 6.36% -0.33%
(0.2991) (5.8891) (1.763) (-0.1235)
1989 14 0.30% 3.38% 2.65% -0.82%
(0.7935) (4.8528)** (0.6401) (-0.3098)
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Exhibit 7: This table displays the average excess returns for a given year over a given time span 
in relation to the announcement date and inclusion date from 1990 to 2015. The table also 
provides data on the sample size for each given year and the t-values of the means after 
performing a standard t-test to test the sign of the average. 
 
Yearly Means Post October 1989      
Year N AD - 1 to AD AD to AD +1 AD to ED AD + 1 to ED ED to ED + 1 AD to ED + 20 AD to ED + 30 ED + 1 to ED + 20 ED + 1 to ED + 30
1990 7 -0.85% 1.78% 5.63% 3.72% -1.30% 1.13% 1.25% 1.07% 0.47%
(-2.13)** (1.423) (2.4357)** (2.6613)** (-1.7249) (0.9962) (0.7451) (0.5071) (0.1387)
1991 6 -0.33% 2.38% 6.10% 3.50% -3.79% -2.27% -3.77% 8.35% 4.74%
(-0.7451) (2.7252)** (1.6468) (1.0837) (-1.4935) (-1.2385) (-1.6327) (1.6236) (1.163)
1992 4 -1.58% 5.76% 4.92% -0.82% 1.11% -2.32% -1.88% 5.39% 5.68%
(-1.5815) (5.0816)** (1.5036) (-0.2443) (0.4625) (-1.9345) (-1.388) (1.1361) (0.9928)
1993 4 -0.19% 3.82% 7.22% 3.31% -0.32% -0.61% -0.41% -0.57% 3.07%
(-0.5904) (2.8798)** (4.072)** (1.4193) (-0.681) (-0.8255) (-0.7156) (-0.2481) (0.5748)
1994 11 -0.25% 2.67% 0.31% -2.34% -0.55% 1.02% 0.59% -3.63% -3.26%
(-0.4452) (4.0372)** (0.0635) (-0.5075) (-1.374) (1.4912) (0.6372) (-1.6433) (-1.3535)
1995 16 -0.20% 3.16% 5.89% 2.60% -0.78% -2.53% -3.29% -0.72% -2.13%
(-0.5699) (4.3273)** (4.1124)** (2.489)** (-1.4108) (-4.2236)** (-4.4123)** (-0.2985) (-0.8373)
1996 12 0.54% 4.74% 11.76% 6.65% -1.55% -3.00% -4.23% -3.92% -6.24%
(0.7177) (5.7809)** (4.9904)** (3.6505)** (-2.1554)** (-4.3626)** (-4.8746)** (-1.4229) (-2.1041)**
1997 19 -0.47% 8.65% 16.34% 7.45% -3.27% -1.69% -3.77% 0.72% -3.78%
(-0.6787) (5.8539) (3.3261)** (1.4524) (-1.2412) (-1.8247)** (-3.4058)** (0.1402) (-1.9068)**
1998 26 0.93% 5.27% 12.85% 7.55% -2.12% -3.24% -4.64% -2.95% -6.01%
(0.9673) (5.4974) (4.4637)** (2.3662)** (-1.4566) (-2.9859)** (-3.4577)** (-0.9427) (-2.544)**
1999 33 0.26% 6.30% 9.56% 3.19% -0.77% -2.04% -2.06% -1.62% -3.09%
(0.5405) (8.0745) (3.4678)** (1.2409) (-1.6482) (-2.5024)** (-2.4167)** (-0.7306) (-1.2544)
2000 33 1.92% 4.19% 8.57% 4.36% -2.39% 0.73% 0.32% 2.74% 1.64%
(1.7841)** (3.1994)** (2.527)** (1.4474) (-2.1754)** (1.0607) (0.5278) (1.0147) (0.5845)
2001 22 -0.54% 2.09% 5.14% 2.87% -0.57% 1.47% 3.60% 3.23% 1.56%
(-0.682) (1.739)** (1.9451)** (1.3538) (-0.7633) (1.3093) (2.2938)** (1.2226) (0.5648)
2002 18 0.41% 2.88% 6.31% 3.55% -0.50% 1.36% 3.42% 3.16% -0.47%
(0.8429) (3.7422)** (3.4278)** (2.4471)** (-0.9225) (1.0227) (3.032)** (0.4767) (-0.2259)
2003 7 0.29% 2.26% 0.83% -1.42% 0.32% -3.05% -4.84% -0.74% -2.96%
(0.3453) (1.8805) (0.556) (-2.0197)** (0.3606) (-2.3408)** (-3.6735)** (-0.3603) (-1.1215)
2004 13 0.36% 1.65% 4.71% 3.02% -0.05% 0.33% 0.35% -1.80% -1.81%
(0.8397) (3.238)** (5.3218)** (3.3058)** (-0.2535) (0.3678) (0.3209) (-1.2532) (-1.1645)
2005 14 0.65% 1.32% 2.18% 0.86% -0.15% -0.25% -0.30% -0.28% -2.94%
(1.7965)** (2.5305)** (2.935)** (1.5535) (-0.3312) (-0.4689) (-0.4499) (-0.197) (-1.4685)
2006 24 1.61% 2.77% 3.81% 1.02% -0.67% -0.86% -0.77% -2.58% -3.78%
(2.4872)** (4.391)** (4.6292)** (1.8178)** (-2.0202)** (-3.3792)** (-1.9486)** (-1.8326)** (-2.5284)**
2007 34 -0.38% 2.26% 5.80% 3.46% -1.51% 0.93% 0.96% 4.72% 0.03%
(-0.7662) (6.2682) (1.9652)** (1.1978) (-1.0069) (1.1745) (1.2112) (1.2188) (0.0159)
2008 33 0.49% 3.76% 4.83% 1.04% -0.76% 7.17% 8.91% -5.37% -8.41%
(0.756) (7.7555) (5.312) (1.3427) (-1.1208) (4.5599) (5.4041) (-2.9865)** (-2.8894)**
2009 22 -0.31% 2.55% 1.83% -0.69% 0.20% -3.02% -4.37% -0.49% -4.64%
(-0.6394) (5.4393) (2.0734)** (-0.8617) (0.3732) (-2.6849)** (-3.2455)** (-0.2413) (-1.9813)**
2010 12 0.53% 2.36% -0.16% -2.44% -0.58% -3.41% -4.95% -2.01% -4.69%
(0.7478) (2.8407)** (-0.1449) (-3.403)** (-2.2392)** (-3.4645)** (-4.2346)** (-0.9798) (-1.5616)
2011 13 0.58% 0.45% 0.24% -0.26% 0.59% -3.40% -2.60% -0.39% 0.44%
(1.0802) (0.4911) (0.1536) (-0.2501) (1.6782) (-3.5334)** (-1.8807)** (-0.245) (0.1863)
2012 13 0.13% 1.82% 0.40% -1.41% 0.42% -1.76% -2.15% -0.08% -2.94%
(0.3552) (2.7951)** (0.3608) (-1.9698)** (0.7768) (-2.114)** (-1.667) (-0.0327) (-0.7009)
2013 15 -0.15% 2.16% 1.61% -0.60% 0.98% -2.15% -1.69% -1.43% -2.35%
(-0.6097) (3.5992)** (1.3558) (-0.8039) (1.1508) (-3.4723)** (-2.3357)** (-1.1988) (-1.8915)**
2014 14 0.01% 1.37% 0.75% -0.62% -0.95% -0.40% -1.41% 1.78% 1.66%
(0.0108) (2.164)** (0.8297) (-1.1663) (-1.9549)** (-0.5068) (-3.4226)** (0.8493) (0.584)
2015 19 -0.27% 1.99% 2.34% 0.32% 0.21% -0.14% -0.02% -0.49% 0.82%
(-0.8112) (2.5403)** (2.6852)** (1.131) (0.732) (-0.1558) (-0.0225) (-0.2795) (0.384)
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Exhibit 8: This table displays the average excess returns for a given year over a given time span 
in relation to the announcement date and inclusion date from 1990 to 2015. This table is simply a 
cleaner version of the table above with only the most salient periods included for analyzing the 
index inclusion effect. Furthermore, the number of observations and the t-tests have been 
purposely omitted for ease of reading the data. 
 
 
 
 
Selected Yearly Means Post October 1989
Year AD to AD +1 AD to ED AD + 1 to ED ED to ED + 1 ED + 1 to ED + 30
1990 1.78% 5.63% 3.72% -1.30% 0.47%
1991 2.38% 6.10% 3.50% -3.79% 4.74%
1992 5.76% 4.92% -0.82% 1.11% 5.68%
1993 3.82% 7.22% 3.31% -0.32% 3.07%
1994 2.67% 0.31% -2.34% -0.55% -3.26%
1995 3.16% 5.89% 2.60% -0.78% -2.13%
1996 4.74% 11.76% 6.65% -1.55% -6.24%
1997 8.65% 16.34% 7.45% -3.27% -3.78%
1998 5.27% 12.85% 7.55% -2.12% -6.01%
1999 6.30% 9.56% 3.19% -0.77% -3.09%
2000 4.19% 8.57% 4.36% -2.39% 1.64%
2001 2.09% 5.14% 2.87% -0.57% 1.56%
2002 2.88% 6.31% 3.55% -0.50% -0.47%
2003 2.26% 0.83% -1.42% 0.32% -2.96%
2004 1.65% 4.71% 3.02% -0.05% -1.81%
2005 1.32% 2.18% 0.86% -0.15% -2.94%
2006 2.77% 3.81% 1.02% -0.67% -3.78%
2007 2.26% 5.80% 3.46% -1.51% 0.03%
2008 3.76% 4.83% 1.04% -0.76% -8.41%
2009 2.55% 1.83% -0.69% 0.20% -4.64%
2010 2.36% -0.16% -2.44% -0.58% -4.69%
2011 0.45% 0.24% -0.26% 0.59% 0.44%
2012 1.82% 0.40% -1.41% 0.42% -2.94%
2013 2.16% 1.61% -0.60% 0.98% -2.35%
2014 1.37% 0.75% -0.62% -0.95% 1.66%
2015 1.99% 2.34% 0.32% 0.21% 0.82%
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Exhibit 9: These tables show the regression outputs of the 10 different explanatory variables 
outlined above against the average excess returns for each year between the announcement date 
and the day after the announcement date and the 10 different explanatory variables against the 
average excess returns for each year between the announcement date and the effective date of 
inclusion. The table also includes the number of observations used in constructing the model and 
the slope and intercept of the resulting model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AD to AD + 1
Variable Observations Rsquare Constant Constant t ratio Beta Beta t Ratio P-Value
AIMF 22 21.09% 4.10% 6.4 -0.000000018 -2.31 0.0315
AIEMF 22 21.06% 4.16% 6.31 -0.000000022 -2.31 0.0317
%EMFI 26 16.91% 4.54% 5.64 -0.150256363 -2.21 0.0369
%PS 25 22.69% 19.75% 3.06 -0.229504720 -2.6 0.0161
IMFSP500 22 20.48% 4.59% 5.56 -0.000000058 -2.27 0.0345
%IMFSP500 22 35.06% -1.32% -0.97 0.076292275 3.29 0.0037
YoY%SP500 21 24.52% 2.17% 4.2 0.034094113 2.48 0.0225
SP500-I 26 12.05% 4.23% 5.31 0.000000000 -1.81 0.0823
YoY%SP500-I 26 4.58% 2.68% 5.54 0.026610387 1.07 0.2938
%SP500MKT 26 0.06% 2.42% 0.51 0.047608707 0.12 0.9087
AD to ED
Variable Observations Rsquare Constant Constant t ratio Beta Beta t Ratio P-Value
AIMF 22 31.36% 7.98% 5.99 -0.000000049 -3.02 0.0067
AIEMF 22 30.21% 8.06% 5.84 -0.000000059 -2.94 0.0081
%EMFI 26 25.26% 8.97% 5.51 -0.391669995 -2.85 0.0089
%PS 25 25.92% 43.05% 3.2 -0.521925107 -2.84 0.0093
IMFSP500 22 24.86% 8.88% 4.96 -0.000000142 -2.57 0.0182
%IMFSP500 22 52.71% -6.82% -2.64 0.208445809 4.72 0.0001
YoY%SP500 21 23.42% 3.14% 2.71 0.074094791 2.41 0.0262
SP500-I 26 15.75% 7.95% 4.78 0.000000000 -2.12 0.0447
YoY%SP500-I 26 4.59% 4.24% 4.12 0.056833489 1.08 0.293
%SP500MKT 26 0.63% 8.75% 0.87 -0.339847686 -0.39 0.7006
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